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Abstract 
Although many individuals spend years and considerable effort to earn their auditing 
certificates, only a small proportion actually apply for the auditing license that would enable 
them to sign audit reports.  Instead, they break from certification functions or engage in 
support activities in auditing firms, a situation that has generated concern within their 
professional associations. In spite of the importance of this phenomenon for research and 
practice, the issue is widely neglected in auditing research. In this investigation, we focus on 
the individual characteristics of newly certified auditors who apply for their auditing 
licenses in anticipation of entering solo practice or a partnership in an auditing firm, 
comparing them to their counterparts who do not apply for such a license. Our analysis 
draws on an integration of the human capital and entrepreneurship literatures, leading us to a 
number of hypotheses that are tested through logistic regression models.  Our findings 
suggest that newly certified auditors who (i) belong to the youngest and oldest age group or 
(ii) possess high general or specific human capital or (iii) have stable jobs are less likely to 
apply for an auditing license than are their middle-aged counterparts, individuals with low 
human capital or those employed in unstable jobs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is ample evidence to suggest that many people who invest the time and effort to 
earn an auditing certificate do not go on to apply for the auditing license that would 
allow them to sign audit reports. As the Chair of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), Robert K. Elliott, claims, “90% of Certified Public 
Accountants (CPAs) do not perform certification functions, focusing instead on 
measuring and advising businesses” (Alles, Kogan, & Vasarhelyi, 2000, p. 16). The 
AICPA also reported that 51% of its members were in public practice in 1985, but that 
only 39.6% engaged in such activities by 1998
1. This downtrend in the proportion of 
certified accountants in public practice is a general phenomenon, as suggested by 
Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson’s (2002) similar findings in the UK. Within the 
public accounting profession, the case of auditing services provides some compelling 
data. In Spain, for example, the proportion of certified auditors holding an auditing 
license t hat would allow them sign audit reports decreased from 36.66% in 1991 to 
28.62% in 2001 (BOICAC, 1991; BOICAC, 2001). These results appealed to 
professional associations like AICPA, which conducted debates on the distinction 
between CPA accreditation and a ctual practice of the profession (Howard, Kotaro, & 
Gleim, 2001). 
 
It is important to differentiate between the auditing certificate and the license to 
practice. Earning an auditing certificate involves a long process of training and 
socialisation, and requires one to pass qualification exams (Robson, Wholey, & 
Barefield, 1996). This process varies somewhat from country to country and does not 
necessarily enable the successful candidate to sign audit reports. In order to legitimately 
place their signatures  on audit reports, certified auditors in most countries must acquire 
an auditing license, which requires them to enrol in the corresponding tax register and to 
demonstrate that they are covered by professional indemnity insurance. 
 
Our review of research on the auditing market highlighted some of its salient 
characteristics: the profile of students entering the profession (Larkin, 1997; Wright, 
1988; Zikmund, Catalanello, & Wegener, 1977); the diffusion of novel governance 
structures among firms offering accounting services (Lee & Pennings, 2002); the 
determinants of high employee turnover in auditing firms (Bullen & Flamholtz, 1985; 
Dillard & Ferris, 1979; Lane & Parkin, 1998; Reed, Kratchman, & Strawser, 1994; 
Rhode, Sorensen, & Lawler III, 1977); and the e ffects of employee turnover on extra 
training, increasing costs, loss of expertise, and the additional efforts that auditing firms 
must deploy in order to support their reputations (Hill, Metzger, & Wermert, 1994). In 
spite of such comprehensive understanding of the auditing market, little is known about 
the small proportion of certified auditors who take the extra step of earning the auditing 
license that would allow them to sign audit reports. Our understanding of this important 
characteristic of the auditing market could be further enhanced by a study comparing 
the profiles of newly certified auditors who apply for their auditing license with newly 
certified auditors who do not apply. 
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The certified auditor who acquires an auditing license and engages in  auditing practice 
is “first and foremost an entrepreneur trying to make a successful living by providing a 
service” (Higson, 1997, p. 203). In the case of auditing organisations, management 
owns the firm (Dillard & Ferris, 1989, p. 224) and the partners put their personal wealth 
and human capital at stake (DeAngelo, 1981, p. 25). This entrepreneurial perspective 
spreads throughout a market populated by small practice units, including self-employed 
auditors (Huefner, 1998). In the USA, for example, the AICPA reported that 131,627 
firms performed public accounting services in 1998 (see Footnote #1). Importantly, 
23.50% (30,932) of such firms had only one employee and 35.8% (47,188) had between 
2 and 9 employees. In the case of Spain, 68.30% of total auditing f irms in 2001 were 
sole proprietorships (BOICAC, 2001).  
 
These data support predictions in the literature on the entrepreneurial profile of auditors 
and indicate that certified auditors who apply for their auditing license may be regarded 
as “potential entrepreneurs” (Erikson, 2001). In this respect, we suggest the notion of an 
auditing entrepreneur, which would encompass those certified auditors who apply for a 
license in anticipation of engaging in a solo practice or in a partnership in an auditing 
firm.  At the same time, the theory of human capital proves useful in illuminating at least 
two characteristics of the auditing market: auditors who move to another firm or leave 
professional practice (Dalton, Hill, & Ramsay, 1997a; Glover, Mynatt, & Schoroeder, 
2000; Hunton & Wier, 1996) and the relationship between human capital in auditing 
firms on the one hand and organisational performance and survival on the other 
(Pennings, Lee, & Witteloostuijn, 1998). Therefore, an integration of the literatures on 
entrepreneurship and human capital may help to ascertain the role of individual 
attributes in the decision of newly certified auditors to apply for an auditing license. 
 
Empirical support for this investigation is gathered from membership to the Instituto de 
Censores Jurados de Cuentas de España (Institute of Sworn Auditors of Spain, ICJCE), 
the earliest professional association of auditors in Spain (Carrera, Gutiérrez, & 
Carmona, 2001). The ICJCE was founded in 1942 and is still in operation. In Spain, the 
auditing profession is regulated by the state and has some characteristics that differ from 
the widely studied Anglo-Saxon settings (Bougen, 1997; Bougen & Vázquez, 1997; 
García Benau, Ruiz Barbadillo, Humphrey, & Al Husaini, 1999). As shown in Figure 1, 
the practice of the accounting profession in many Anglo-Saxon countries requires an 
individual to hold a professional certificate: that of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 
in the USA and as a Chartered Accountant (CA) in the UK. Certified accountants may 
either enter public practice or engage in services like corporate or governmental 
practice. For those who engage in public practice, performance of attest services is of 
special interest for our purposes, because it presents auditing as one possibility. In 
Spain, the route into the practice of auditing differs from the Anglo-Saxon example in 
several respects. As a distinct feature, the Spanish setting is characterised by the 
absence of an accounting profession, inasmuch as only the auditing profession exists 
(see Figure 1). To gain the right to sign audit reports, one must obtain an auditing 
certificate, which requires a demanding three-step examination (Pont Mestres, 1991). 
Individuals who earn the auditing certificate can then either apply for an auditing 
                                                                                                                                               
1 Data from http://www.aicpa.org/about/annrpt/1996%2D1997/sources.htm and 
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license that would enable them to sign audit reports or become an auditor on leave (see 
Figure 2). The former route requires individuals to purchase professional liability 
insurance and to enter themselves into the tax register of the Ministry of Finance as 
freelance auditing professionals. Holders of auditing licenses offer their professional 
services either as self-employed auditors or as partners in auditing firms  – that is, as 
auditing entrepreneurs. Alternatively, newly certified auditors may either break  from the 
profession or perform support activities in auditing firms, neither of which requires 
them to hold an auditing certificate (see Figure 2). 
Fig. 1. How to become a licensed auditor 
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The decision of a newly certified auditor to obtain an auditing license and to become an 
entrepreneur may be influenced by institutional factors (e.g., changes in regulation), the 
market (e.g., comparative salaries in different jobs), or individual factors (e.g., 
education, age, job stability). In this paper, we focus on the individual factors of those 
who obtain an auditing certificate after a long process of examinations and proceed with 
the application of an auditing license vis-à-vis their counterparts who do otherwise. 
 
Our observation period extends from 1976 to 1988  – from the time the incipient 
democracy brought about the liberalisation of the Spanish economy and the demand for 
auditing services, to the adaptation of the Spanish auditing regulation to the provisions 
of the 8
th Directive of the European Economic Community (EEC). Spain enacted its 
Audit Law in 1988, enforcing significant changes in the organisation of the auditing 
profession (Bougen, 1997). Regrettably for our purposes, the accompanying regulation 
of the Spanish Audit Law relieved professional associations of the responsibility of 
keeping records of such crucial characteristics as the educational background of 
certified auditors at the time of accreditation. We therefore have a break in our series of 
data that required us to end our observation period in 1988. We built our database from 
the completed entries of all 2,633 newly certified auditors from the Official Register of 
the ICJCE during our observation period. 
 
This investigation may be of interest to accounting researchers for several reasons. It 
goes beyond the usual study of large, Anglo-Saxon firms to enhance our knowledge of 
career decisions among newly certified auditors and to highlight the qualification 
potential and the role of the auditing certificate in a model that combines the literature 
on entrepreneurship with the literature on human capital. 
 
Auditing research has been dominated by studies that focus on  large firms. In a market 
populated by small firms and sole practitioners (Dillard & Ferris, 1989), investigation of 
the relationship between the individual characteristics of newly certified auditors and 
their decisions about becoming entrepreneurs may shed some light on a neglected 
perspective of the auditing market. 
 
Most of the  auditing research reported in international academic journals has focused 
not only on large firms, but also on  Anglo-Saxon settings in North America and the 
United Kingdom (see Bougen & Vázquez, 1997). In this study we have gone beyond 
these restricted populations by investigating Spanish auditors, thereby offering further 
insights into what appears to be a universal problem in the auditing profession. 
 
Some commentators believe that the relationship between the auditing profession and 
auditing work has been “broken” (Abbott, 1988, p. 144), insofar as individuals do not 
tend to engage in the profession for which they are certified. Therefore, an investigation 
of the attributes of newly certified auditors as they are in the process of deciding if they 
should  apply for an auditing license that would enable them to sign audit reports may 
highlight the  qualification potential of the auditing certificate and its role in the breach 
that has occurred between the certification function and the profession at large.  IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
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Finally, our study draws on an integration of the  entrepreneurship and human capital 
literatures that we deem relevant to explaining some specifics of the auditing profession 
and that may be helpful in laying the groundwork for future research in this area.  
 
Theory and hypotheses 
The early contributions of Knight (1921) and Schumpeter (1934) to the 
entrepreneurship literature lead to two opposing conclusions. Knight (1921) reasoned 
that skilled individuals who understand their own abilities would be likely to turn to 
entrepreneurship in order to capitalise on their expertise. And in fact, modern defenders 
of this career theory, like Borjas and Bronars (1989), have found that education, age, 
and work experience all have positive effects on the self-employment decision. 
Schumpeter (1934), on the other hand, conceptualised the entrepreneurial decision as a 
second-best option for individuals who are unable to remove some “structural 
constraint” such as ethnic minority status, immigration status, or residence in  a region of 
high unemployment (e.g., Carr, 1996). Supporting this contention, Carroll and 
Mosakowski (1987) have found a positive relationship between self-employment on the 
one hand and entrepreneurial family background and Protestantism on the other. 
Furthermore, Evans and Leighton (1989) report that individuals with work experience 
and spells of unemployment, low-paid wage work, and many job shifts have higher self-
employment probabilities than do their counterparts who do not have these experiences. 
Other variables affecting the choice for or against entrepreneurship include financial 
capital (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998), psychological 
factors (e.g., perception of risk; Khilstrom & Laffont, 1979; Knight, 1921), and the 
comparative, expected yields from entrepreneurship versus salaried occupations (Evans 
& Leighton, 1989). 
 
Our study focuses on a particular time in the auditor’s life (Carroll & Mosakowski, 
1987) – the point at which newly certified auditors decide whether or not to apply for an 
auditing license. For those who apply for an auditing license, the auditing certificate 
constitutes a prerequisite to the long process of establishing their own business or 
becoming partner in an auditing firm. In contrast, for those not interested in public 
practice, the auditing certificate arguably represents a professional qualification that 
may expand their labour market opportunities (Anderson-Gough  et al., 1998; 2002; 
Bullen & Flamholtz, 1985). In short, individuals who expect to capitalise on such 
expertise, either by becoming auditing entrepreneurs or by enhancing their labour 
market opportunities, may approach the auditing certification process as an investment 
in human capital. 
 
The theory of human capital has highlighted some of the individual determinants of 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Carr, 1996; Hundley, 2000; Tucker, 1990), such as the effects of 
the founder’s human capital on organisational performance (e.g., Bates, 1985; Gimeno, 
Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; Pennings  et al., 1998; Preisendörfer & Voss, 1990). A 
basic tenet of human capital theory is that individuals spend time and money on 
themselves for the sake of future pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns (Becker, 1975; 
Blaug, 1976; Schultz, 1963), thereby increasing their specific or general human capital. IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
  6
General human capital refers to the acquisition of a comprehensive formal education 
and training like college education that is relatively transferable across firms and 
industries. Conversely, specific human capital strengthens a n individual’s knowledge 
about the idiosyncratic routines and procedures utilised in a particular firm that are less 
easily transferred. As noted by Becker (1975), increases in human capital, either general 
or specific, lead to productivity improvements, b ut such advancements can only be 
achieved at a cost. If that were not the case, there would be an unlimited demand for 
training. 
 
General Human Capital 
Individuals with high levels of general human capital receive more formal training than 
do those with lower levels of general human capital; furthermore, the high human 
capital auditors are expected to be more efficient in their jobs and to enjoy a 
considerable number of labour market opportunities (Becker, 1962; Blaug, 1970; 
Mincer, 1962). Conversely, individuals with low levels of general human capital are 
regarded as being less efficient in the workplace and are more likely to face spells of 
unemployment (Blaug, 1970; 1976) than are their counterparts with higher levels of 
general human capital. Accordingly, individuals who aim at increasing their general 
human capital are prone to sacrifice current returns because of their expectancies of 
high, future earnings (Blaug, 1970; Mincer, 1962). Furthermore, as shown by Carr’s 
(1996) study of professional men, those with high levels of education are less likely to 
be self-employed than are their counterparts with low educational levels
2, a finding 
reinforced by Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer’s (2001) research. In summary, then, it 
appears that individuals who invest in formal education and general training tend to be 
more efficient in their jobs, which in turn increases their chances of promotion and 
tenure (Groot & Van den Brinks, 2000; Hachen, 1990) as well as their external job-
market opportunities. In view of such internal and external opportunities, these 
individuals are regarded as less likely than their counterparts with low general human 
capital to change their occupational status by becoming self-employed (Blanchflower & 
Oswald, 1998). Taken together, these studies clearly represent the entrepreneurial 
decision as a default career choice. 
 
Auditors with a high level of educational attainment are likely to deliver consistent and 
high quality services inside their auditing firms (Pennings  et al., 1998). Hunton and 
Wier (1996) investigated the promotion of accountants working for private sector firms 
and found that attained education and professional certification  – that is, general human 
capital  – exerts a significant, positive influence on the time-to-promotion decision. For 
example, accountants with a post-baccalaureate education experienced faster 
promotions than did their counterparts with a bachelor’s degree. Moreover, Hunton and 
Wier (1996) revealed that professionally certified accountants were promoted more 
quickly than were their non-certified counterparts. In summary, auditing research is 
consistent with predictions that individuals with a high general human capital are seen 
                                                 
2 For occupational groups other than that of professional men, Carr (1996) found a positive relationship 
between high levels of education and self-employment. Evans and Leighton (1989) reported additional 
evidence of a positive relationship between general human capital and the probability of becoming self-
employed.  IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
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to be more competent and reliable than are their counterparts with low general human 
capital, thereby increasing their chances of promotion and tenure. Further, inasmuch as 
general human capital is transferable across firms, auditors with high general human 
capital enjoy good market opportunities. Such internal and external opportunities 
suggest that an auditor with high general human capital would be reluctant to apply for 
an auditing license and become an auditing entrepreneur, leading us to hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis  1 (H1):  General human capital will be negatively associated with  the 
likelihood of newly certified auditors becoming auditing entrepreneurs. 
 
Specific Human Capital 
Mincer (1962) has conceptualised specific training as an investment that increases the 
marginal product of those who invest in it by improving an individual’s knowledge of 
workplace routines and procedures. As noted by Becker (1975), the idiosyncratic nature 
of specific human capital makes it difficult to transfer across organisations. Individuals 
who acquire specific human capital engage in within-the-firm t raining programmes and 
have on-the-job experiences that increase their expectancies of promotion and tenure, 
providing them with little incentive to leave their firms (Mincer, 1993). The employee-
employer relationship is further reinforced through programmes aimed at enhancing 
specific human capital (Cappelli & Cascio, 1991; Groot & Van den Brinks, 2000), 
which ultimately increases the internal mobility of employees but poses serious barriers 
to their external mobility. 
 
Auditing firms face high levels of e mployee turnover, which affects their efficiency 
(Dalton  et al., 1997a; Rasch & Harrell, 1990; Rhode et al., 1977). In order to curb this 
problem, auditing firms deploy internal, extensive, and compulsory training 
programmes that increase the expertise of  their employees in a firm’s routines and 
procedures, and their specific human capital (Pennings  et al., 1998). Such training 
programmes are regarded as part of a general programme of socialisation of individuals 
into the organisational culture and, therefore, “they are first and foremost a commitment 
to an individual firm” (Anderson-Gough  et al., 1998, p. 3). Specific human capital helps 
to produce high quality auditing services and decreases employee turnover. Thus, 
increases in specific human capital socialises employees, updates them in the particulars 
of a firm’s internal procedures, increases their productivity and chances of promotion, 
and lowers the probability of their leaving the organisation (Pillsbury, Capozzoli, & 
Ciampa, 1989). Because internal  procedures tend not to be transferable, auditors who 
engage in within-the-firm training programmes expect to capitalise on such knowledge 
by increasing their chances of promotion and tenure, and are less likely to become self-
employed in the auditing market than are their counterparts who have not been trained 
in-house (Anderson-Gough et al. 1998; Robson et al., 1996). Thus we hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis  2 (H2) : Specific human capital will be negatively associated with the 
likelihood of newly certified auditors being self-employed. 
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One beneficial effect of specific human capital is an increased likelihood of promotion 
into a partnership in an auditing firm, a position requiring comprehensive knowledge of 
internal procedures and commitment to the firm (Anderson-Gough  et al., 1998). If the 
accumulation of specific human capital were not largely dependent upon time and 
seniority (Becker, 1975), it would be difficult for auditing firms to provide intensive in-
company training to employees, while simultaneously delivering professional services 
to clients. Therefore, employees with long seniority in auditing firms have arguably 
accumulated sufficient specific human capital to become eligible for promotion to 
partner positions. In accounting firms, for example, Robson  et al. (1996) report that a 
regular career from a junior accountant to a partnership position takes between 10 and 
12 years. Promotion to a partnership position in an auditing firm, in turn, constitutes an 
entrepreneurial decision that requires candidates  to possess an auditing certification as a 
prerequisite for applying for an auditing license. Thus we hypothesise:  
 
Hypothesis  2 -1  (H2-1):  Specific human capital will be positively associated with the 





The entrepreneurship literature contends that self-employment decisions are contingent 
upon the age of the individual (Casson, 1982). Young people, it is argued, lack the 
experience, skills, and material resources to make a successful entry into the 
entrepreneurial market (Evans & Jovanovich, 1989). Such considerations, we contend, 
may particularly apply to such professional services as auditing, which rely upon 
professional reputation and social capital (see Anderson-Gough  et al., 1998; Pennings et 
al., 1998) rather than, for instance, the manufacture of innovative products, which relies 
upon creativity. Therefore, it is expected that entrepreneurial behaviour is more likely to 
be found in older individuals  than in their younger counterparts (Carr, 1996; 
Blanchflower  et al., 2001). Young individuals, we argue, use the auditing certificate as 
a formal endorsement of their professional qualifications, thereby enhancing their 
chances of internal and external mobility, and are much less likely to use it as a 
prerequisite in the process of applying for an auditing license and becoming an auditing 
entrepreneur. 
 
Entrepreneurship involves risk and uncertainty, which individuals perceive differently 
as a function of their age. Older individuals – especially those close to retirement – tend 
to be risk averse (Bates, 1990), a characteristic that suggests they will be reluctant to 
leave salaried work for the uncertainties of self-employment (Hachen, 1990). Legal and 
financial risks inherent to the auditing profession (Dalton  et al., 1997a; 1997b; Simunic 
& Stein, 1996) add to the usual uncertainties of entrepreneurship. At the same time, the 
expectancies of financial return for older, newly certified auditors are lower than that of 
their younger counterparts because they are restricted to the remaining, short period 
prior to retirement. In summary, then, older, newly certified auditors take a high risk by 
entering entrepreneurship and have low return expectancies, suggesting that they would IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
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be unlikely to apply for an auditing license. For older individuals, pursuing an auditing 
certificate serves the purpose of promotion and a signal of professional qualifications. 
 
Middle-aged individuals have accumulated working experience, knowledge of the 
market, and professional reputation (Borjas, 1986; Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 
1992; Knight, 1921). Furthermore, they can expect returns from their entrepreneurial 
efforts over the long period before their retirement. In addition, the middle-aged auditor 
is likely to have enough material resources to establish a new business and to tackle its 
concomitant financial and legal risks. Arguably, such individuals strive for an auditing 
certificate in order to obtain a promotion to partner or to establish their own auditing 
firm. Taken together, this reasoning leads us to hypothesise:  
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The decision of a newly certified auditor to become an auditing 
entrepreneur will have an inverted-U-shaped relationship with age.  
 
 
Switching costs: Job stability 
The chances of an entrepreneurial entry are negatively related to the costs of leaving an 
employment situation (Gimeno  et al., 1997)  – tangible expenses as well as more 
intangible burdens. Such costs  are largely determined by  the relative stability and 
security between present and alternative occupations (Hundley, 2000). Public sector 
employees provide a particularly strong example of switching costs because they enjoy 
long-term stability, regular salary, predictability, and an internal system of promotion 
(Hincliffle, 1987), as evidenced by low employee turnover in public sector jobs 
(Hachen, 1990).  
 
Newly certified auditors assess their switching costs by comparing their occupational 
status with eventual entrepreneurship in t he auditing market. The latter involves risks 
arising from client liability and third party liability (e.g., Dalton  et al., 1997b; 
Johnstone, 2000; Simunic & Stein, 1996) that people working in jobs characterised by a 
high degree of stability, security, and insulation from external competition may consider 
as being too high  (Hachen, 1990). Therefore, such individuals with high switching costs 
that make them unlikely to apply for an auditing license and become entrepreneurs in 
such a market are more likely t o use an auditing certificate to enhance their chances of 
promotion. Thus we hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis  4 (H4) : The entrepreneurial decision of newly certified auditors will be 
negatively affected by high switching costs from the present occupation of such 
individuals. IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
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THE SETTING, DATA SOURCE, VARIABLES, AND METHODS 
The setting and data source 
Our setting is the ICJCE, membership in which is regulated by its Bylaws. To become a 
member of ICJCE, one must: (i) be a Spanish citizen, (ii) be 18 years of age or older, 
(iii) hold a university degree or equivalent, (iv) and have professional experience in 
auditing, accounting, and business administration. In addition, one must (v) have 
received a pass on a series of qualification exams, and (vi) never have been convicted of 
a crime. Upon meeting these requirements, successful candidates are granted an 
auditing certificate and gain entry into the membership of the ICJCE. In order to sign 
audit reports, however, one requires an auditing license from the ICJCE. An applicant 
for an auditing license (i) must be on file as a freelance auditing professional in the 
official tax register, and (ii) must have obtained acceptable insurance coverage for 
professional indemnity. Therefore, the ICJCE is comprised of (i) auditing entrepreneurs, 
who hold an auditing license ( ejercientes  or licensed auditors) and are either self-
employed or partners in auditing firms and (ii) auditors who hold only an auditing 
certificate (no ejercientes – non-licensed auditors or auditors on leave) and are unable to 
sign audit reports. 
 
The ICJCE’s directories and personal files of members contained information about the 
name, address, date of admission in the ICJCE, educational background, occupational 
status, previous jobs, and eventual application for an auditing license at the time of 
entry in the ICJCE. Our data are based on 2,633 individuals with completed entries who 
earned an auditing certificate between 1976 and 1988; 1,931 (73.34%) of whom filed an 
application for an auditing license at the time of joining the ICJCE and 702 (26.66%) of 
whom did not apply for such a license but became auditors on leave immediately after 
obtaining their auditing certificate.  
 
Methods 
We used a logistic regression in order to model the likelihood that newly certified 
auditors become licensed auditors rather than auditors on leave (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
1989), a decision similar to the eventual withdrawal of auditing partners from their 
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b0  is the estimated constant,  
b1 through bp are the estimated coefficients,  
c1 through cp are the independent variables. 
Operationalisation of variables 
Table 1 identifies the variables used in this analysis.  
License. The dependent variable,  License,  depicts the decision of newly certified 
auditors to apply for an auditing license or to become auditors on leave. This 
dichotomous variable was coded 1 = licensed auditor; 0 = auditor on leave, a 
categorisation similar to those used in the studies in Amemiya’s (1981) review of 
individual choices among labour market opportunities (Dalton et al., 1997b).  
 
Table 1 
Name and definitions of variables 
 
Education.  The literature on human capital has utilised years of education a nd 
educational levels as proxy measures of general human capital (see, e.g., Carr, 1996; 
Carroll & Mosakowski, 1987; Hundley, 2000). Thus the  Education variable, which 
depicted the educational background of the newly certified auditors, was coded with 
three levels of education: 1 = a three-year university degree; 2 = a five-year university 
degree; and 3 = a tertiary degree (e.g., M.Sc., Ph.D.).  
 
Big  Firms. In-company training is regarded as a measure of employee socialisation 
(Pennings  et al., 1998) as well as an enhancer of specific human capital. Large firms 
seek to acquaint their employees with their routines and procedures, providing them 
with vast, in-house training programmes (Alba-Ramírez, 1994), which ultimately 
increase the specific human capital o f employees (Becker, 1962, pp. 17-18).  The 
auditing market comprises large firms as well as small units and sole practitioners 
(Anderson-Gough  et al., 2002). Empirical evidence on the training programmes of big 
auditing firms reveals a complex web of formal and informal rules that must be learned 
by those working for such organisations ( Anderson-Gough  et al., 1998; Grey, 1998; 
Variable  Definition 
License  1 = individual is a licensed auditor; 0 individual is an auditor on leave 
Education 
1 = auditor has a three-year university degree; 2 = auditor has a five-year university degree; 3 = auditor has 
a superior degree (Master or Ph.D.) 
Big Firms 
1 = individual is working for a leading domestic or international auditing firm at time of entry; 0 = 
individual does not work for such a firm 
Age  Individual’s age in years at the time of entry into the profession 
AgeSQ  Age x Age 
Public Sector 
1 = auditor was working in the public sector at the time of joining ICJCE; 0 = individual does not work in 
the public  
Gender  1 = female; 0 = male  
Market 
Density 
1 = individual established in Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, or Biscay; 0 = individual established 
elsewhere  
Year 
1 = joined ICJCE between 1976 and 1979; 2 = joined ICJCE between 1980 and1983; 3 = joined ICJCE 
between 1984 and 1987; 4 = joined ICJCE in 1988 IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                               28 / 10 / 2003  
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Pennings  et al., 1998). In contrast, the routines of small accounting firms are not as 
formally established, and employees learn them through significant on-the-job 
exposure. Importantly, as noted by Robson  et al. (1996), employees in such small firms 
spend considerable time in non-auditing activities, which provides them with a general 
knowledge of the profession. Therefore, auditors  working for the  leading domestic or 
international auditing firms are expected to gain more specific human capital than are 
their counterparts in small firms. The  Big Firms variable was created to identify 
individuals working for large firms at the time of  affiliation to the ICJCE. This variable 
was coded: 1 = individual worked for a leading domestic or international auditing firm 
at time of entry and 0 = individual did not work for such a firm. 
 
Age. This variable is regularly employed in both the human capital literature and the 
entrepreneurship literature (Becker, 1975; Carr, 1996; Evans & Leighton, 1989; Rhode 
et al., 1977). We used a continuous variable to measure the individual’s age, in years, at 
the time of joining the ICJCE. We hypothesised a quadratic or U -shaped relationship 
between the individual’s age and the likelihood of engaging in the practice of auditing. 
Both the variables  Age  and its square value ( AgeSQ) were included in our analysis in 
order to capture such a non-linear relationship (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989: 95; see 
Evans & Leighton, 1989). 
 
Public  sector. Hachen (1990) contends that job stability and job security are associated 
with public sector jobs, and we draw on such insights to measure the switching costs 
related to the entrepreneurial decision of newly certified auditors. Our dichotomous 
variable,  Public Sector, is coded 1 = individual was working in the public sector at the 
time of joining the ICJCE, and 0 = individual does not work in the public sector.  
 
Control  variables.  Previous research shows gender differences in the Spanish auditing 
market (Carrera  et al., 2001). Women were barred from the auditing profession by the 
ICJCE until 1976. Although the number of women in the ICJCE have increased 
annually since 1976, the number of m en joining the ICJCE has been significantly 
higher, making auditing a male-dominated profession (Carrera  et al., 2001). Research 
on self-employment decisions shows that women’s decisions differ from those of men; 
women, for instance, place higher emphasis  on their families when making the 
entrepreneurial decision(Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Carr, 1996; Hundley, 2000). 
Thus we have created the Gender variable, which is coded 1 = female and 0 = male. 
 
The supply of auditing services depends on the number of auditors in the market 
(Pennings  et al., 1998). In the case of the Spanish auditing market, auditor density is 
largely contingent upon geographical distribution. The Spanish provinces of Madrid, 
Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, and Biscay reported the highest density of auditors during 
our observation period. Thus we create the variable,  Market Density, to identify the 
province in which auditors established their offices and offered their professional 
services: 1 = individual established in Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, or Biscay; 
0 = individual established elsewhere.  
 
We argue that the decision to become an auditing entrepreneur may be also influenced 
by contextual factors, such as expected changes and actual enforcement of auditing 
regulations. Therefore, the moment an individual is granted an auditing certificate may 
constitute a relevant variable for explaining the likelihood of applying for an auditing 
license. We created the variable  Year as an indicator of the time the individual joined IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                28 / 10 / 2003  
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the ICJCE, establishing four sub-periods in an attempt to capture significant changes in 
the Spanish auditing profession. First, we considered the period 1976-1979, which was 
characterised by a monopoly of ICJCE members in the provision of auditing services to 
firms established in Spain. Second, the period 1980-1983 witnessed the removal of this 
monopoly and the emergence of other professional associations in the country (i.e., 
Registro de Economistas Auditores, the Register of Economists-Auditors, REA). Third, 
the period 1984-1987 was characterised by the actual challenge of auditors from other 
professional associations to ICJCE’s members. Finally, we considered 1988  – the year 
when the Spanish Audit Law was discussed and passed in the Spanish parliament.  
 
Results 
We conducted a preliminary analysis of the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. The univariate analysis revealed some degree of association 
between the variables included in our model and the probability of applying for an 
auditing license. Table 2 depicts the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for 
the variables included in our model. As shown in Table 2, arithmetic means indicate 
that licensed auditors have a lower education level and are older than auditors on leave, 
and that the latter are likely to work for the public sector. The correlation matrix 
indicates that there are many significant correlations, but of such low magnitude that we 
did not identify collinearity problems in our model.  
 
Table 2 
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Model 1 in Table 3 shows results of the multivariate logistic regression model for H1-
H4. All variables but Gender and the constant are significant at a = 0.01. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness of fit test indicates that the model is well fitted to the data. 
 
Table 3 
Logit analysis results to test for differences between Licensed Auditors and Auditors on Leave 
 
  Model 1 
(main effects) 
Model 2 
(main effects and interaction) 
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient 































































Age x Big Firms   
0.087* 
(0.024) 
     
Pseudo R
2:  0.132  0.137 









     
       Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
*     p = .01 (two-tail test) 
**   p = .10 
 Note:    
Education2  Five-year university degree 
Education3  Graduate degree (Master Degree or Doctorate) 
Year2  Auditor’s year of access: 1980 to 1983 
Year3  Auditor’s year of access: 1984 to 1987 
Year4  Auditor’s year of access: 1988 
   
 
 IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                28 / 10 / 2003  
  15
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the likelihood of newly certified auditors becoming 
entrepreneurs is negatively associated with their level of general human 
capital. We found support for this contention if the coefficients of Education2 
(individual holds a five-year university degree) and  Education3 (individual 
holds a tertiary degree) variables were negative and significant. Model 1 in 
Table 3 reveals that both  Education2 and Education3 have negative (-0.724 
and  -0.758, respectively) and significant ( a = 0.01) coefficients.  Ceteris 
paribus, this finding demonstrates that newly qualified auditors with high 
general human capital were less likely to apply for an auditing license and 
become auditing entrepreneurs than were their counterparts with low general 
human capital.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2 contends that the likelihood of newly certified auditors 
becoming entrepreneurs through self-employment is negatively associated 
with their level of specific human capital. We would find support for H2 if the 
coefficient of the Big Firms variable (individuals working for a leading 
auditing firm) were negative and significant. Model 1 reveals that the 
coefficient for  Big Firms  is negative ( -0.884) and significant ( a = 0.01). 
Ceteris paribus, this finding indicates that newly qualified auditors with high 
levels of specific human capital are less likely to apply for an auditing license 
and enter self-employment than are their counterparts with low specific human 
capital. Other things being equal, then, newly c ertified auditors who have 
been  exposed to on-the-job training programmes in their present firms (e.g., 
large auditing firms) are less likely to apply for an auditing license, and 
become entrepreneurs through self-employment, than are their counterparts 




Hypothesis 3 predicts that the decision of a newly certified auditor to become 
an auditing entrepreneur exhibits an inverted-U-shaped relationship with age. 
Our r esults show that both  Age and  AgeSQ are significant ( a = 0.01) and 
suggest a concave relationship between age and the likelihood of becoming an 
auditing entrepreneur. This finding is reinforced by the results of the 
estimated odds ratios for Age, as derived from Model 1. Adjusted odds ratios 
approach the likelihood for the outcome that newly certified auditors apply for 









                                                 
3 We calculate adjusted odds ratios instead of adjusted estimated probabilities to avoid the eventual, 
confounding effects of other variables included in our model (see Appendix).  IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
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Fig. 3. Propensity to become a Licensed Auditor by Age (adjusted odds ratios) 
 
Figure 3 shows that middle-aged, newly certified auditors were more likely to engage in 
auditing entrepreneurship than were their younger or older counterparts. Our results 
showed that the likelihood of becoming a l icensed auditor increased until newly 
certified auditors reached 38-39 years, at which point there was a negative relationship 
between auditing entrepreneurship and age. For example, we measured the propensity to 
become an auditing entrepreneur by comparing newly certified auditors 33 years of age, 
the mean of the distribution of the variable  Age, with individuals that earned their 
auditing certificate at other ages. Our results revealed that such propensity to engage in 
auditing practice was i) 0.6 as frequent among individuals of 25 years; ii) 1.12 times 
more frequent for 39-years-olds; and iii) 0.52 as frequent for 55-year-olds. In support of 
H3, then, our results indicated that younger and older newly certified auditors were less 
likely to become auditing entrepreneurs than were their middle-aged counterparts.  
 
Hypothesis 4 states that the likelihood of newly qualified auditors becoming auditing 
entrepreneurs is negatively associated with the stability and security of their present job. 
Support for this  contention would require the coefficient of  Public Sector to be 
significant and negative. Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the coefficient of the variable is 
negative ( -1.634) and significant ( a = 0.01).  Ceteris paribus, this result indicates that 
newly certified auditors whose present job is secure and stable are less likely to apply 
for an auditing license than are their counterparts with less secure and stable 
occupations. In particular, qualified auditors who work in the public sector tend not to 
become auditing entrepreneurs, in spite of holding an auditing certificate. 
Hypothesis 2 -1 predicts that specific human capital will be positively associated with 
the likelihood that newly certified auditors become entrepreneurs through promotion to 
partnership positions in auditing firms. Support for this contention would require 
calculation of the joint effects of the newly certified auditor working for one of the big 
auditing firms and having greater seniority with their firm. As we do not have data 
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indicating t he length of time individuals have worked for the same auditing firm, we 
have used the variable  Age  as a proxy for seniority. Therefore, such joint effects are 
measured through the interaction term  Age x  Big Firms, and support for our hypothesis 
would require a positive, significant coefficient. We also expect a significant and 
negative coefficient for Big Firms,  as per Model 1. The logistic regression shown in 
Model 1 did not capture eventual interactions between variables and we therefore 
calculated Model 2 (see Table 3). We found that both Big Firms and Age x Big Firms 
are significant ( a = 0.01). Furthermore, we found the expected signs for both 
coefficients: negative ( -3.522) for Big Firms and positive (0.087) for Age x Big Firms. 
In spite of the high correlation between this interaction term and Large Firms (0.982) 
that might generate multicollinearity and loss of significance for some variables (Capelli 
& Cascio, 1991), inclusion of this variable did not provoke loss of significance in the 
Big Firms coefficient, but the model remained well fitted to the data, as shown by the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test. Therefore, our results indicated a positive 
relationship between auditing entrepreneurship and employment with a leading auditing 
firm when age  at the time of entry considered. Finally, the remainder coefficients both 
for independent and control variables are similar to those displayed in the model 
without interactions. 
 
We calculated the adjusted odds ratios to further explore the relationship between  Age 
and  Big Firms. The adjusted odds ratios measured the likelihood of a newly certified 
auditor working for a big auditing firm becoming an auditing entrepreneur (see Figure 
4).  
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As shown in Figure 4, the adjusted odds ratios depict different patterns for each group 
of individuals. Newly certified auditors who do not work for a leading auditing firm 
show a declining likelihood of becoming auditing entrepreneurs between the ages of 40 
and  45 years. After the age of 45, however, auditors working for leading auditing firms 
are increasingly likely to obtain their auditing licenses. For such individuals, this result 
is consistent with the relationship between age and promotion to partnership positions.  
 
With the exception of  Gender and the intercept, the remaining control variables are all 
significant at a = 0.01 in both models (see Table 3). The coefficients for the dummies of 
the variable  Year  are negative, meaning that the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur 
in the Spanish auditing market is smaller for the sub-periods 1980-1983, 1984-1987, 
and 1988, in comparison to the first sub-period, 1976-1979. However, this negative 
impact is proportionally smaller over time, indicating that individuals are more likely to 
become auditing entrepreneurs at the end of the period under investigation than in 
previous years. The political stability of the 1980s, the economic growth experienced by 
the country, and the expectations generated by the new regulation for the Spanish 
auditing market (the Audit Law was enacted in 1988) could explain this tendency. 
Finally, the coefficient for  Market Density  was significant and negative (see Table 3). 
As expected, in those regions where the number of competitors is h igher, individuals are 
less likely to become entrepreneurs in the auditing market. 
 
General discussion 
Many individuals spend years and considerable effort to earn the auditing certificate that 
would enable them to apply for an auditing license, which would ultimately allow them 
to sign audit reports. Yet, when the time comes, many either leave auditing or engage in 
support activities within auditing firms. In spite of the importance of this phenomenon 
for professional associations and for our understanding of the auditing profession at 
large, the issue has been widely neglected in auditing research. In this investigation, we 
focus on individual characteristics of newly qualified auditors who apply for the 
auditing license that would allow them to sign audit reports. Empirical evidence 
supporting this investigation is gathered from the archives of the oldest Spanish 
association of auditors. Our hypotheses draw on an integration of the human capital and 
entrepreneurship literatures and are tested through logistic regression models.  
 
Our results provide support for the notion that newly qualified auditors with high 
general human capital are less likely to become auditing entrepreneurs than are their 
counterparts with low general human capital. This finding suggests two additional 
considerations. First, although individuals with high general human capital participate 
in the training and examination programmes that earn them an auditing certificate, 
professional practice does not appeal to them as much as it does  to their counterparts 
with low general human capital. For the former, motivation to enrol in such a 
demanding process may be a response to a willingness to increase their general human 
capital, which in turn could enhance their prospects of job productivity, promotion, and 
income (Blaug, 1970; Bullen & Flamholtz, 1985). Our findings reveal that individuals 
with high general human capital who succeed in earning an auditing certificate do not 
usually apply for the auditing license that would enable them to sign audit reports. We IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                              28 / 10 / 2003  
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argue that, for such individuals, the auditing certificate may represent professional 
reputation as well as a widening of job opportunities (Hunton & Wier, 1996). Thus 
holders of auditing certificates may pose implicit threats to their present employers 
because of their increased job opportunities. 
 
Second, the notion that individuals with high human capital are less likely to enter the 
auditing profession than are their counterparts with low human capital may signal a 
need for reflection on the part of professional associations of auditors. Our findings 
suggest that it may become difficult for the auditing profession to attract the most 
talented individuals. Career theory,  which considers self-employment as a decision of 
those who wish  to take advantage of their capabilities, predicts that high levels of 
human capital will increase the likelihood of self-employment  (Borjas & Bronars, 
1989). In contrast, our results suggest that the most talented people will prefer other 
occupations over  auditing entrepreneurship.  The entrepreneurial decision in the auditing 
market, therefore, supports the predictions of self-employment as a default option for 
those individuals facing constraints. 
 
Our results indicate that newly certified auditors with high specific human capital are 
less likely to enter self-employment than are their counterparts with low specific human 
capital. This finding suggests two additional considerations: in-house training 
programmes and the auditing certificate as levers for promotion.  
 
Auditing firms face a high and costly turnover of employees (Hill  et al., 1994; Lane & 
Parkin, 1998). Therefore,  training programmes are designed to update employees with 
state-of-art techniques, to foster socialisation and contractual relationships, and to signal 
opportunities for promotion (Anderson-Gough  et al., 1998). Notwithstanding, the 
training programmes of auditing firms do not attempt to increase the general human 
capital of employees, as such knowledge may be easily transferred across f irms and 
ultimately benefit competitors (Becker, 1975). To some extent, such on-the-job training 
programmes aim at exposing participants to a number of idiosyncratic procedures that 
can only be transferred to other organisations at a high cost, and ultimately decrease 
employee turnover. 
 
The auditing certificate may also be used as a  lever for promotion. Individuals who 
participate in their firms’ training programmes may consider that returns from such a 
specific human capital investments can be achieved only if they continue to work for 
their present employer. Therefore, individuals with high specific working capital have 
less incentive to assume the inherent legal and financial risks of auditing 
entrepreneurship (Simunic & Stein, 1996). In this context, newly qualified auditors with 
highly specific human capital who engage in the training and examination process that 
leads to an auditing certificate may be signalling their intent to leave their present 
employer and may thereby enhance their reputation and chances of promotion. 
One of our models included interaction effects between the variables Age x  Big Firms, 
and there was a significant and negative impact of this interaction on the probability of 
becoming a licensed auditor. We expected an interaction between age and specific 
human capital ( an individual’s idiosyncratic experience in his/her organisation, such as IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
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knowledge about clients). In organisations with internal labour markets, Hachen (1990) 
observed that the longer the contractual relationship, the greater the opportunity for 
upward mobility. In large firms, auditors with long seniority are likely to be promoted 
into partnership positions, and firms typically make such decisions after an individual 
has been employed for 10 to 12 years (Robson  et al., 1996). Auditing partnerships, in 
turn, involve an entrepreneurial decision in terms of ownership and management of the 
firm, which may explain why older employees in big auditing firms are more likely than 
their small-firm counterparts to engage in the e xamination process that leads to an 
auditing certificate as a pre-requisite to obtaining an auditing license.  In short, these 
newly certified auditors apply for an auditing license to enhance their promotion 
opportunities for a partnership position within  their present firms rather than 
establishing their own auditing business.  
 
Our results indicate that newly qualified auditors apply for auditing licenses and 
become auditing entrepreneurs with a probability that exhibits an inverted-U 
relationship with age: the youngest and the oldest are less likely to undertake auditing 
practice than are their middle-aged counterparts. This finding suggests that the 
development of auditing practice involves exposure to liabilities, which are not easily 
assessed by young  people who lack auditing experience (see Johnstone, 2000; Simunic 
& Stein, 1996). Furthermore, young people may lack the necessary expertise to curb 
their involvement in such liabilities and may lack the financial resources to afford 
professional liability premiums or the high fines that could result from losing a court 
case. In a similar vein, older people may perceive that the potential returns from an 
auditing practice would be diminished because of their impending retirement, a factor 
that may discourage them from applying for their auditing licenses and becoming 
auditing entrepreneurs. Whereas older individuals hired by the large firms may rightly 
assume that they can acquire future compensation packages from partnership positions, 
those who aim at solo practice face considerable income uncertainties. 
 
Finally, we found that individuals in stable jobs are less likely to become auditing 
entrepreneurs than are their counterparts in less stable occupations. As noted above, the 
development of a solo practice or being a partner in an auditing firm involves risks and 
liabilities (Johnstone, 2000; Simunic & Stein, 1996). Arguably, individuals in stable 
jobs (e.g., civil servants) may tend to be risk adverse– to choose the advantages of a 
stable job over higher p rivate sector salaries (Hinchliffe, 1987). Consequently, for 
individuals in stable jobs, the motivation for participating in the training and 
examination process that leads to an auditing certificate may stem from their interest in 
enhancing their reputation and increasing their promotional opportunities within the 
public sector, and from a desire to signal their willingness to undertake occasional 
collaboration with auditing firms. Such cooperation, in turn, may help these individuals 
increase their public sector income, which is often relatively low, without assuming the 
risks associated with auditing entrepreneurship. The auditing qualification certificate 
may also enhance the career prospects of civil servants in, for example, internal auditing 
agencies. IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                              28 / 10 / 2003  
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Limitations, extensions and concluding remarks 
There are five limitations to this study that may encourage other researchers to further 
investigate the career decisions of auditors. For example, we employed a limited time 
frame and a limited number of proxy variables. Furthermore, our analyses did not 
include the comparative salaries associated with different career options, individual 
differences in financial worth and attitudes toward risk, or the various institutional 
factors that may have an impact on auditor’s career decisions. 
 
Because there was a break in the sequence of our data, we were only able to study the 
limited time frame of 1976 to 1988 and did not have the opportunity to capture the 
effects of more recent changes in the auditing market. Yet changes such as the 
increasing diversification of accounting firms to cope with the stagnation of revenues 
from auditing services (e.g., certification of the integrity and security of information 
systems of firms) could affect an individual’s decision to obtain an auditing license and 
become an auditing entrepreneur. 
 
In this study we used educational background and the contractual relationship with large 
auditing firms as our  limited proxy variables for general and specific human capitals, 
respectively.  Although such proxy variables have been used consistently in the human 
capital literature, we believe that other proxy variables, such as a firm’s investment in 
training, may provide additional insights into the notion of human capital in auditing 
firms.  
 
Little attention has been paid in this study to the financial remuneration of auditors in 
various sectors of the economy. The  comparative salaries of employees in auditing 
firms, public sector agencies, and self-employment units may provide insights into  the 
decision not to apply for an auditing license after one has received a qualifying 
certificate.  
 
The self-employment decision involves set-up costs that are likely tied to an 
individual’s financial capital (Blanchflower & Oswald 1998). Additionally, there may 
be large individual differences in the perception of the auditing industry as a highly 
risky business in which personal wealth, human capital, and reputation are at stake 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Individual differences in financial worth and attitudes toward risk 
could provide additional insights into the entrepreneurial decision of newly certified 
auditors.  
 
Finally, our examination of the variables affecting the career decisions of newly 
certified auditors has focused primarily on individual factors. Investigation of the effects 
of  institutional factors such as regulation changes, which affect the risk of becoming an 
auditing entrepreneur; as well as market factors, such as the opportunity costs of 
rejecting such possible career paths as that of a financial advisor, would enhance our 
understanding of a neglected area in auditing research. IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                 28 / 10 / 2003  
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Taken together, our results provide a depiction of individuals who either apply or do not 
apply for an auditing license when they earn their auditing certificate. We find that 
auditors (i) who are at the younger or older end of the age continuum or (ii) who have 
higher levels of general or specific high human capital or (ii) who have stable jobs are 
less likely to apply for the auditing licenses that would enable them to  sign auditing 
reports than are their counterparts who (i) are middle-aged or (ii) have low human 
capital or (iii) have unstable jobs. These findings have implications for the practice of 
auditing. In particular, professional associations of auditors might  wish to reflect about 
the extent to which the practice of auditing actually appeals to highly qualified 
individuals.  IE Working Paper                                 CG8-104-I                                28 / 10 / 2003  
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Appendix 
The adjusted odds ratios were calculated taking as reference group the median of  Age 
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where Agei is the i -individual’s age at the time of joining the ICJCE and X* is the set of 
variables included in the model that are different from Age and AgeSQ. 
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